


## AIRPROX REPORT No 2021050

Date: 19 Apr 2021 Time: 1354Z Position: 5112N 00050W Location: Challock – elev. 600ft

### PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	SZD 51 Junior	PA28
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Basic
Provider	Challock	Southend
Altitude/FL	NR	1900ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	White	White, black, red
Lighting	Not fitted	Strobes, nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5-10km	NR 'Haze'
Altitude/FL	1500ft	2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (NK hPa)	QNH (NK hPa)
Heading	~360°	NK
Speed	~50kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Unknown
Alert	N/A	Unknown
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	100-200ft V/200m H	Not seen
Recorded	NK	



**THE SZD 51 JUNIOR INSTRUCTOR** reports that they were the instructor in charge at the gliding club launch point. A moderately experienced solo pilot was winch launched to about 900ft QFE on a heading of about 360°. As the glider got to the top of the launch a powered aircraft was seen approaching over the field, heading about 315° at a similar height. The glider pilot did not see the powered aircraft and made a gentle turn to the left to start a circuit as the powered aircraft passed on the right.

The Instructor assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE PA28 INSTRUCTOR** reports conducting a CPL training flight so lookout would have been made by both pilots. The Instructor did not recall the incident. The only thing they could add was that they remembered the visibility was poor that day and were certainly not expecting gliders to be airborne.

**THE SOUTHEND CONTROLLER** reports that the PA28 pilot, on a navigational exercise, was in receipt of a Basic Service but no Airprox was reported on frequency. The PA28 was observed overhead Challock at the notified time of the Airprox.

### **Factual Background**

The weather at Lydd, Southend and Gatwick was recorded as follows:

METAR EGMD 191350Z 10009KT 9999 FEW030 10/06 Q1021=  
 METAR EGMC 191350Z 11007KT CAVOK 13/05 Q1021=  
 METAR EGKK 191350Z 06005KT 340V120 CAVOK 16/01 Q1020=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The SZD 51 Junior and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the SZD 51 Junior pilot had right of way and the PA28 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.<sup>2</sup> An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.<sup>3</sup> If the solo glider pilot winch launched to about 900ft QFE, as reported, then the aircraft would have been separated vertically by about 400ft.

### Southend ATSU Investigation

Challock is a known glider airfield and listed in MATS Part 2, however this is only for information purposes. No procedures or agreements are in place between Southend ATC and Challock airfield or the gliding operation. Therefore, Southend ATC has no additional information on activity at Challock than is published in AIP or NOTAM. Challock airfield is published as a Glider operation and shown as such on aeronautical charts. The airfield does not have an ATZ so there is not a requirement for the pilot to avoid overflying the airfield below 2000ft. It is the responsibility of the pilot to consider the operation and fly accordingly.

The other aircraft involved (not receiving a service from Southend) was believed to be a glider, which due to their nature do not have good reflective properties for primary surveillance systems so are unlikely, at that range and height, to appear on the situation display. There were no signs of aerial activity in the vicinity of Challock for the controller to pass generic traffic information. If a primary contact had appeared on the display, as there is no requirement to monitor flights under a Basic service, it is not known if a potential confliction would have been spotted or if traffic information would have been passed. It is not possible to judge the risk of collision or relative positions between the two aircraft as the reporting aircraft was not receiving a service from Southend, did not appear on the surveillance situation displays and no details or reports from the pilots involved have been seen by Southend ATC.

## Comments

### BGA

Due to the fact that gliders can operate normally local to an airfield in what the rest of GA might think were limiting conditions, it must never be assumed that a gliding site is inactive, unless this has been specifically confirmed. Winch launches may veer to one side and present a risk even to aircraft not immediately overhead the winch run. Many sites have a discrete frequency and would appreciate a call from anyone transiting close by.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a SZD 51 Junior glider and a PA28 flew into proximity near Challock at about 1354Z on Monday 19<sup>th</sup> April 2021. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the SZD 51 Junior pilot listening out on the Secondary Common Glider Field Frequency and the PA28 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from Southend.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant

<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

<sup>3</sup> (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members provided a combination of written contributions and dial-in/VTC comments.

The Board first noted that although the PA28 had not overflown the glider site, it had passed in such close proximity that it was felt it had posed a hazard to winch launching gliders (**CF2**). Members wondered to what degree the CPL Instructor was aware of the hazard created by overflight, or near overflight, of a winch launching glider site or of the location of Challock gliding site. Gliding members reiterated that gliders routinely operated in what may be considered adverse weather conditions, that may preclude cross-country flights but were suitable for training in winching and circuit procedures, and thus would be conducted in the vicinity of a glider site. Members also noted that the maximum winch launch altitude was noted on the VFR chart, 2600ft in the case of Challock, and that the base of the London TMA in the area would have allowed the PA28 pilot to operate comfortably above this altitude. It was felt that flight in such proximity to a gliding site was unnecessary, created the circumstances for a potential risk bearing incident and did not set a good example to a prospective commercial pilot. R/T contact with a gliding site was a useful tool to increase SA and members discussed the progress of the UKAB Recommendation for Airprox 2020083, that 'The CAA includes glider site ICFs, as supplied by the BGA, in the UK AIP ENR 5.5'. A CAA advisor informed the Board that although the recommendation had been accepted, some areas of work were required before it could be implemented and that this was underway. A gliding member pointed out that many glider sites can be contacted on either of the primary (129.980MHz) or secondary (118.685MHz) Common Glider Field Frequencies. Safety Sense Leaflet 5 (VFR Navigation) recommends that glider winch-launching sites should be avoided and the Skyway Code states: 'You should never overfly a glider site below the specified winch launch altitude. You may encounter a vertical winch cable.'

The PA28 pilot was not in receipt of a FIS that required the controller to monitor the aircraft (**CF1**) and neither pilot had SA on the other approaching aircraft (**CF3**). Additionally, neither pilot saw the other aircraft (**CF4**), which some members thought, in sum, amounted to safety being compromised. However, after further discussion it was accepted that the fortuitous vertical separation at CPA mean that although normal safety standards had been eroded, there was no actual risk of collision.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

	2021050			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Ground Elements</b>				
<b>• Situational Awareness and Action</b>				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>				
2	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	An event involving navigation of the aircraft.	Flew through promulgated and active airspace
<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>				
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late or only generic, Situational Awareness
<b>• See and Avoid</b>				
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Recommendation: Nil.

Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **not used** because neither pilot was under a service that required controller monitoring of potential conflicts.

**Flight Elements:**

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot flew close to the promulgated and active gliding site.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had SA on the position of the other aircraft.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot saw the other aircraft.

		Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness Barrier Weighting				
						0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	✓	✓					
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓	✓	✓					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✓	○	✓	○					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○	○	○					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	✓	✓					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	⚠	✓	⚠					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓	✗	✓					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○	○	○					
	See & Avoid	✗	✗	✗	✗					
<b>Key:</b>		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u>	<u>Not Used</u>				
Provision		✓	⚠	✗	○					
Application		✓	⚠	✗	○					
Effectiveness										

<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).